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Prologue 
Mikel Dufrenne’s The Notion of the A Priori (1966) is a classic example of the second 
wave of phenomenology.  Standing on the foundations laid by Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, Sartre and Scheler, Dufrenne’s seminal text re-engages Kant’s critical philosophy in order 
to rescue the a priori from the static and transcendental prisons of mere formalism and 
universality.  He identifies a menagerie of a priori types in order to explicate the fundamental 
meaningfulness of experience.  This is evidenced in the distinct, yet intimately connected 
subjective and objective a priori, which function in harmonious relationships.  These latter are 
exemplified by the affectual immediacy of (ethical) values given in experience.  Knowledge and 
truth are only products of explication and reflection, performed by persons, and which rely on 
meaningful experience.  The understanding that for humans that what is is to be judged by what 
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ought to be, needs to be re-evaluated, for what ought to be is given in what is, and hence is not 
judged from a distance, but rather in the instance.  For Dufrenne, the poetic, narrative in its most 
creative mode, presents us with the instance and immediacy of feeling and meaning from which 
truth flows. 
Entry 1: Kant 
Dufrenne has a problem with Kant.  Kant’s critical philosophy reconceived and 
radicalized the philosophical understanding of the a priori.  According to Kant, a priori concepts 
were abstract, non-contingent, non-empirical, objective, formal, necessary and universal.  
Furthermore, these concepts were housed in the mental faculties of rational (human) beings.  
Kant’s faculty psychology (of reason, understanding, sensibility, judgment, and imagination) 
varied across his three Critiques, in terms of structure and functions. 
 The Critique of Reason and the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics aimed to 
explain what it is that we can know, the limits of our knowledge, and how knowledge is 
generated.  Kant’s arguments are complex.  We can have two kinds of knowledge: empirical 
knowledge grounded in our experiences and expressed through synthetic a posteriori judgments; 
and metaphysical knowledge expressed by analytic a priori judgments (Hume’s relations of 
ideas) and synthetic a priori judgments.  Analytic judgments are simply definitions and do not 
add to our knowledge; however, synthetic judgments add to our knowledge, thus making 
synthetic a priori judgments the focus for Kant’s establishment of a science of metaphysics. 
 Dufrenne’s claim, and he is not alone in this for Merleau-Ponty, Scheler, and Samuel 
Todes also recognize the issue, is that Kant has overly intellectualized the a priori.  In Kant’s 
schematism, our synthetic a posteriori judgments are propositions that refer to phenomena.  
These phenomena appear in our empirical cognitions.  Cognitions are constituted out of the 
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manifold that is presented to the faculty of sensibility.  This constructive synthesis employs the 
various a priori concepts of the understanding and judgment, rendering experience intelligible.  
Hence, intelligibility is firmly ensconced within cognition; the realm of thought is the only place 
where understanding occurs.  The external world, the source of phenomena, the noumena that 
“stand behind” the manifold, remains forever out of reach; intelligibility has no place “there”.  
But is this the case?  Is it that the world outside of the mind is senseless?  To which Dufrenne 
(and these others) answer: no.  There are resources in Kant to escape the mental prison of 
transcendental philosophy. 
 The Kantian schematism injects objectivity via a priori concepts into appearances.  These 
concepts are the conditions for knowledge, but a posteriori judgments have two further grounds: 
time and space.  These conditions for the possibility of experience are derived from the faculty of 
sensibility, that is, Kant identifies some of his a priori (time and space) with our perceptual 
capabilities.  Consequently the a priori and the a posteriori share an intimacy that Dufrenne is 
going to explore.1  This point can be further supported by way of Kant’s treatment of the 
imagination; while he does say that the transcendental imagination is the transcendental 
understanding, this holds only when the two are considered solely with respect to or is limited to 
their formal functions, not when their synthetical functions are treated.2  This latter occurs during 
that “lucky chance”3 or “happy accident” when over the course of experience, the imagination, in 
service to the understanding, “always” correctly delivers the raw “data” (intuitions) of the 
manifold from sensibility to the appropriate concepts in the understanding in order for empirical 
cognitions to be generated.4  The imagination would seem to have both a pre-conceptual 
understanding of what understanding demands, which might be explained by the identity of their 
formal functionality, but this may also be the case because the imagination is informed by the 
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“raw” data from sensibilty’s passive receptivity; “… in a sense it [the manifold] already 
possesses meaning beforehand; it is as if it [the subject] had always already found it” as 
meaningful.5  The imagination can properly associate empirical intuitions with Kant’s a priori 
concepts: “In brief, for there to be association, the given must be associable, and this 
characteristic of the given cannot be the product of the principle of association.”6
Entry 2: The a priori 
  This 
demonstrates that the manifold, in terms of time and space, conjoined with its own proclivity for 
certain conceptual schemes, bears some intelligibility that is non-cognitive, which while 
anathema to Kant, is nevertheless evident. 
 To explain Dufrenne, it pays to “cheat” with his arguments, that is, to begin with his 
conclusions and work backwards.  The Notion of the A Priori aims to explicate the harmonious 
accord that is experienced between human beings and the world.  This does not mean that 
Dufrenne holds that this is the best of all possible worlds, but rather that just as humans can 
comprehend the world, so too the world can comprehend human beings; comprehension here 
means understanding and grasping within a relationship of “indispensable reciprocity”7 or 
“reciprocal envelopment”.8  The subject, which Dufrenne sees as being too abstract and prefers 
the material and existential term “person”, is a being in the world:  “The finite subject is the 
person: the universal in the singular, the transcendental in the empirical.”9  Subsequently, the 
mortal dualism that humans encounter and with which we contend is necessary and positive.  
This necessity is succinctly expressed by Merleau-Ponty’s claim that we are “condemned to 
meaning”.10
 Human experience is intrinsically meaningful.  How does Dufrenne justify this and 
explain how meanings are generated?  The Notion of the A Priori examines, contra Kant, the 
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realm of the objective a priori.  The objective a priori are constitutive of objects.  “The objective 
a priori is the meaning which exists in the object and with which the subject is in primordial 
accord.”11  This accord is characterized by reciprocity and harmony.  The objective a priori 
present, or better yet, express themselves in both formal and material aspects.  The formal 
objective a priori are the universal characteristics shared amongst particular classes of objects:  
“the idea of a formal a priori recommends itself by the priority it grants to logic…in 
Kant…[these] criteria are the necessity and universality which may characterize a proposition.”12  
The material a priori of objects are the intrinsic properties of individual things.  These objective 
a priori give themselves to persons.  “The a priori is the meaning present and given in both the 
object and subject, and it assures their communication while maintaining their difference.”13
Persons, on the other hand, are constituted a bit differently.  Dufrenne calls this their 
existential a priori, the sum total of the a priori of and in the individual:  “The existential a 
priori is the summation of those a priori which (insofar as they are subjective) determine the 
field of my intention [visée] and the style of my relationship with the world.”
 
14  The nature of the 
existential a priori both generalizes and singularizes.15  The subjective a priori are readily 
available for the transcendental subject who can reflect upon and make explicit the meanings 
given by the objective a priori.  The subjective a priori are a reserve of virtual knowledge that is 
seemingly already and always known.  “[The] a priori is known a priori.  In other words, we are 
not merely receptive in our relation with the world; we go out to meet it, and always anticipate it.  
There are things we do not learn; we know them from the beginning, as if we had always been 
familiar with them—as if comprehension implies connaturality.”16  Persons are passive, i.e., 
receptive, and perhaps more importantly, active in their engagement with the world—we go out 
to meet it.  Dufrenne likens the connaturality of the a priori to innate knowledge, but it must be 
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noted that he adheres to the Lockean17 and general empiricist rejection of such knowledge as 
propositional; rather, virtual knowledge is more akin to “knowing how” (to grasp the object in its 
meaningfulness) as opposed to “knowing that” (an object has this particular meaning).  The 
subjective a priori, “in its original state…is neither explicit knowledge nor a condensed 
knowledge put into storage.  It is a power of anticipating and revealing, a nonacquired familiarity 
with certain aspects of the world; this power exists in the subject like a mode of being.”18  
Persons experience the a priori as immediate and affective.  Feelings, especially aesthetic, but 
also moral emotions are indicative of our grasp of an object’s meaningfulness; for example, 
Dufrenne refers to how music can evoke joy and youthfulness, just like a child’s bright smile 
does.  What is presented in these experiences calls forth, solicits, or provokes19 our subjective a 
priori, and the meaningfulness we perceive is as if we had previously, before the experience, 
knew what they would evidence.  These a priori are given to us “in presence”, and as such they 
can be “actualized by representation”.20  Representations are said and can be verified or falsified.  
True statements thus rely on the prior perception of the a priori.  Through reflection and 
language the a priori are made explicit; cognition and speaking translate the virtual into the 
actual, the meaningful into meaning, expression into saying.21
Entry 3: Saying  
 
 For Dufrenne, the a priori, subjective or objectiven can be expressed.  Expression is akin 
to manifestation or appearance.22
[It] is immanent in the expressive object, yet knowable and thus able to maintain a certain 
independence from this object.  Hence, whatever expresses itself is worthy of being termed 
a “self”; it expresses itself because it is a self, and it is a self to the extent that it is more 
than a self—i.e., to the extent that the self is no longer a mere empirical particularity, but 
the positing of a universal.  Expression implies self-expression, the act of a subject who 
solicits the attention of others and also presupposes them within himself.  This is why we 
  Self-expression is a special kind or mode of expression.  This 
involves a paradox: 
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may say that an expressive object is a quasi-subject; it partakes of humanity when we 
participate in it; this is especially true of a work of art, though also of any object that 
“speaks” to us.23
 
 
The Dufrenne’s claims certainly hearken to his interests in aesthetics, where the latter’s mode of 
being acts like the humanity (which is an ideal or task24) from which it stems.  Persons are self-
expressive, which is a mode of their being, which presupposes others.  While Dufrenne never 
mentions him, Martin Buber’s insights from I and Thou can aid in unpacking this relation.  
Buber writes, “In the beginning is relation—as category of being, readiness, grasping form, 
mould for the soul; it is the a priori of relation, the inborn Thou.”25
I do not recognize my fellow man by projecting onto him a certain idea that I have of him: I 
know him before knowing myself, and I learn to know myself through him.  Even before 
saying that he is similar to me, I have to realize that I am similar to him; this is perhaps the 
most irritating discovery, one that we are careful to dissimulate and forget; yet it is the 
primary discovery, even in the order of reasons: I am made in the image of the other.
  The other is innately 
structured in the subject.  This fits into Dufrenne’s recasting of the a priori, for it plays a 
constitutive role as an element in one’s existential a priori.  Yet Dufrenne radicalizes this insight:  
26
 
 
The other has an ontological priority or constitutive a priority for persons who become who they 
are through the other.  The person’s individuality is not simply a product of their particular 
embodiment, because this also requires action.  For the subject, “Consciousness is the act rather 
than the possession of the subject…”27 and one of the qualities of this actor is that “[in] every 
consciousness, it becomes conscious of itself as unique and irreplaceable.”28  This uniqueness 
and irreplaceability also marks the other:  “Uniqueness is certainly what we admire in another 
person, but it does not constitute him, at least with respect to our knowing him; this uniqueness 
evades all apprehension and definite meaning.”29  Buber similarly distinguishes between the 
human ability to say his two basic word pairs, “I-You” and “I-It”:  “I-You” is open and 
authentic, spoken with one’s whole being to a person who reciprocally responds with their whole 
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being and maintains an explicit understanding that the “You” so addressed remains beyond 
conceptualization, i.e., apprehension and definite meaning (Dufrenne).  On the other hand, the 
basic word pair “I-It” involves conceptually mediated statements, such as intentions or means-
ends propositions.  “I-It” is the language of representational and propositional knowledge.  It is 
spoken by a person who withholds parts of themselves, keeping something of themselves in 
reserve.  Only in speaking the “I-You”, for Buber, can one fully actualize oneself for it can only 
be spoken with one’s whole being.   
Dufrenne likewise distinguishes specific self-expressions: authentic expressions express 
the a priori.  These expressions express “the total meaning unifying the being that expresses 
itself: to express oneself is to be completely present in one’s expression.”30  The similarity to 
Buber is astonishing, for him presence is only encountered in a dialogical relation between 
persons.  However, each such saying always has the fate or doom of falling back into the 
language of “I-It”.  In this regard, Dufrenne offers a description that borders on a prescription for 
avoiding the imposition of categories or facades:  “To put on an air is to ‘act’ and to choose a 
mask instead of a manner of being.  It is also to act upon the other person instead of offering 
oneself to him.  Authentic expression does not intend to say something: it says it.”31
Drawing together these considerations, we can provide a corrective for Buber and open 
the narrative elements of Dufrenne’s a priori of the poetic.  Self-expressive persons, in saying 
authentically, disclose themselves.  Ideally, their authentic self-expression discloses their 
existential a priori, but not in a reductive manner.  It is not as though such an expression grants 
“true” knowledge about the speaker, but rather just as the objective a priori solicit the subjective 
a priori of the perceiver whose response is a seemingly innate familiarity with the object in the 
world, the speaker evokes their connaturality with the addressee, and the addressee’s reciprocity 
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occurs (is encountered) in the meaningfulness of perception:  “…the a priori is first of all 
perceived.  For the apprehension of an expression by feeling is the highest moment of 
perception, the moment when perception is fully achieved and when the subject somehow 
becomes the perceived object [subject]—at least experiencing the object [subject] to the point of 
losing himself in it.”32
Entry 4: Narratives 
  The speaker’s disclosure, their con-fession or pro-fession, conveys 
meaning whose veracity is neither here nor there for it bears no relevance for the encounter or 
expressed existential a priori. 
 In the Buberian encounter, the self stands in relation to the other.  This relation is one of 
wholeness, meaning that the self expresses itself completely in addressing the other, who 
reciprocates.  This is the essence of Buber’s dialogical philosophy as expressed in the presences 
of the self and other to each other.  But to what end?  This question highlights a problem in the 
encounter: what is the content of addressing the other with one’s whole being?  What is said in 
saying the “I-You” basic word pair?  Dufrenne’s notion of the a priori can be used to fill in this 
lacuna.  Authentic self-expression is not simply the complete or absolute offering of oneself to 
the other, saying with one’s whole being, but rather an expression of one’s existential a priori.  
Granted in self-expression, one says about oneself (propositionally), but more importantly one 
says of oneself (meaningfully).  Dufrenne’s The Notion of the A Priori culminates in a treatment 
of the poetic.  While this is heavily indebted to the later Heidegger, looking at the poetic as 
narrative in its most creative mode opens for viewing the content of the presence in authentic 
self-expression.  “[Poetry] is the expression of an experience which refuses to be enclosed in a 
system and which is its own self-revelation.”33  Through “self-revelation” qua self-expression, 
that content, perceived “apriorily”, comprehension of and by the self and other occurs.  Personal 
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narratives move us, affect us, say something of the speaker and the listener, for “poetry is not 
only feeling in the poet, but also an aspect of the world.”34  Furthermore, “Poetry moves within 
the sphere of feeling.  There is poetry when something is communicated to us which is 
communicable in this way alone: all art is poetic.”35  Poetry communicates the world, “for the 
world is nothing more than the manifestation of feeling, and feeling is the soul of the world.”36  
Feeling denotes that unmediated harmonious accord between human beings and world in which 
meanings are expressed.  Hence, Dufrenne insightfully asserts, “Truth signifies the necessity 
with which something gives itself to us…[this is] the necessity of meaning.”37
 Dufrenne’s book aimed to revitalize the a priori.  His success in this regard opens new 
avenues for not just Kantian scholarship, but phenomenology.  Persons are embedded in a world 
of expressive a priori which always and already calls for us to say more.  This is the necessary 
truth of our lives.  
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